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International Pressure to Perform: Counterterrorism Policy
Development in Finland
Leena Malkki
Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
The major terrorist attacks in Western countries during the last fifteen
years have had consequences way beyond the countries in which they
have happened. The article provides a primary source–based account
of the development of counterterrorism policy in Finland, which is one
of those countries with a low national threat level. The article
demonstrates the significant role that international pressure, through
obligations, recommendations, and social learning, plays in developing
national counterterrorist policies. The article calls also into question
whether the pressure to comply with international pressure always
contributes toward sound national counterterrorism policies that
foster political resilience to terrorism.
The major terrorist attacks in Western countries during the last fifteen years have had conse-
quences way beyond the countries in which they have happened. An important intermedia-
tor and multiplier of these effects has been the conclusions that states and international
organizations have reached in terms of what kind of action needs to be taken to prevent
attacks in the future. As is well known, international cooperation in counterterrorism has
intensified and broadened considerably. It has become virtually impossible for any country
not to develop some kind of counterterrorist policies without risking its standing and reputa-
tion within the international community. This has also made counterterrorism increasingly
relevant for those countries that have not witnessed terrorist attacks on their soil.
There is also another development that has made countering terrorism a more important
issue for these countries. Since 9/11, the scope of counterterrorist policies has broadened
and now include a much stronger emphasis on early prevention than was the case before.
This may be seen both in the obligations set down for states by, for example, the UN and the
EU to criminalize a range of acts related to the preparation of and rendering assistance to
terrorist attacks (e.g., incitement, training, recruitment, and financing) and the programs to
prevent the radicalization into violent extremism that have burgeoned especially in Western
Europe since 2005.1 Following this logic, the state should not focus just on preventing
attacks, but also search for ways to mitigate the risk of terrorism-related activities in the
future.
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The changing dynamics of international counterterrorism cooperation become particu-
larly evident when one looks at developments through the lens of the periphery. In this arti-
cle, Finland provides just such a lens. Finland is undeniably one of those European countries
that have had the least experience of terrorism in recent decades. In the Global Terrorism
Index, Finland is among those countries with a reading of zero. Zero is also officially the
number of terrorist attacks in Finland after the Second World War.2 At the same time, Fin-
land is a member of all the major international organizations (with the exception of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) and aspires to be seen as a good international
partner.
The article provides a historical account, based on primary sources, of the development of
Finnish counterterrorism policy since the 1990s. It focuses on identifying the major drivers
behind changes in this policy. Through this analysis, the article wishes to demonstrate the
significant role that international pressure, through obligations, recommendations, and
social learning, can play in developing national counterterrorist policies.
A second set of questions explored in this article is what we should think about this inter-
national pressure to perform, especially in the case of countries that have a low national
threat level. International pressure to improve counterterrorism is commonly seen as a posi-
tive force. The key rationale for introducing international treaties in this field is to make sure
that no state becomes a safe haven for terrorism due to its lax counterterrorist policies. While
acknowledging the positive influences of international cooperation, the article also calls into
question whether international pressure always points in the right direction, that is, toward
better national counterterrorism policies. It should not be taken for granted that simply fol-
lowing the recommendations and pressure coming, for example, from the UN and the EU is
always the soundest way to work toward a society and political system resilient in the face of
terrorism at the national level. It might be argued that political resilience versus terrorism
can sometimes also mean resilience against international pressure to excel in creating
impressive counterterrorism policies.
The Changing Dynamics of Counterterrorism
Despite the large number of studies on terrorism and the political significance of counterter-
rorism, there are still surprisingly few studies that address the development of counterterror-
ism policy, especially from a theoretical perspective. There are various recent studies that
create typologies of different counterterrorist tactics and approaches,3 aim at comparing the
counterterrorist policies of different countries, assess the consequences or effectiveness of
counterterrorism,4 analyze counterterrorism from the performative perspective,5 or docu-
ment and analyze counterterrorist initiatives taken by international bodies.6 There is also a
body of literature that takes a critical stand toward counterterrorist policies by criticizing the
“War on Terror” for its excesses7 and analyzing how the idea of resilience in counterterror-
ism thinking, which is currently popular, is tied to neoliberal forms of governmentality.8
While many of these studies provide insights that are also helpful for this study, there is a
limited number of studies that directly address the question of what drives counterterrorism
policymaking. A common argument put forward in the literature is that nothing drives
counterterrorism policymaking like a (spectacular) terrorist attack. It is common to link the
development of a state’s counterterrorism policy to the terrorist threat that it is facing. This
notion is also supported by empirical evidence about policy development at the national and
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international level. For example, several researchers have noted that counterterrorism
became a major policy area in the European Union only after the “wake-up call” served by
the 9/11 attacks, even though there had been activity within the EU in that area already
before that. In the years that followed, counterterrorism policymaking was characterized by
“successive shock waves, propelled by major attacks, but gradually winding down once the
sense of urgency had faded away.”9
Studies also point out that the development of counterterrorism policy is a highly politi-
cized undertaking. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, political leaders face strong pressure
to show that they are both determined and capable of acting against the terrorist threat. It
may well be that some of the measures taken against terrorism don’t necessarily always
reflect the understanding of policymakers about what would “work” best against terrorism,
but rather are influenced just as much by what seems politically beneficial. Studies point out
that governments may have a tendency to prefer those counterterrorism measures that are
observable to the public.10 The terrorist threat has also sometimes been seen as a good topic
for playing politics more broadly. Policies and measures that may have not received enough
support otherwise have been pushed through by connecting them to counterterrorism.11
More generally, counterterrorism is always “a reflection of the domestic political process,”
as Martha Crenshaw has highlighted.12 The framing of the terrorism problem (e.g., as a
crime or war) will influence which institutions are charged with countering it. Bringing an
issue onto the political agenda, and the way that it is framed, is unavoidably linked to politi-
cal calculations. Moreover, the way in which counterterrorism policy implementation is
organized will have its effects on which actors strive to be part of it.
Another well-established observation in the research literature is that states do not
develop their counterterrorist policies in a vacuum. Different countries’ counterterrorist pol-
icies influence each other and there is a small number of studies that explore these dynamics.
One mechanism by which this influencing can happen is through the observed negative
externalities that one country’s counterterrorist policy exerts on other countries.13 What
researchers mean by this is that when one country tightens its defensive counterterrorist pol-
icies aiming at protecting potential domestic terrorist targets, other countries come under
pressure to introduce similar kinds of measures in order not to become seen as a “soft target”
in the eyes of those planning terrorist attacks. Another form of this argument claims that not
all countries are equally important points of references, but that the states compare their pol-
icies in particular with those countries that face the same threat level.14
Counterterrorist policy drivers are not in place forever but may change over time as the
political situation changes. This seems to have happened recently with regard to interna-
tional influences over national counterterrorism policymaking. Recent literature suggests
that the dynamics of counterterrorism policy have changed since 9/11 as international coun-
terterrorist cooperation has intensified and broadened. This issue has not been systematically
analyzed to date, but there are a few studies that point in this direction. If counterterrorism
was ever simply countering terrorism, this is definitely not the case anymore. In a recent
study, Elena Pokalova concludes that there is a difference between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 in
terms of what drives states to adopt new counterterrorism legislation. Whereas the decision
to adopt new legislation used to correlate with the number of terrorist organizations in the
country, it is not a primary explaining factor anymore. Instead, after 9/11, the most signifi-
cant predictor has been participation in the War on Terror and existing counterterrorism
legislation.15
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This same phenomenon is also apparent in Mariya Y. Omelicheva’s study of Estonian
counterterrorism policy. Like Finland, the terrorist threat in Estonia has been considered
very low. Still, the country has adopted extensive counterterrorism measures in recent years,
including taking part in international peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations, includ-
ing those in Iraq. Omelicheva concludes that Estonia’s counterterrorism activities derive
from its membership in the EU and NATO and a commitment to contribute to cooperation
within these contexts.16
The following analysis of the policy drivers of Finnish counterterrorism policy builds on
these insights. It presents a historical analysis of the policy’s development from the bottom
up, aiming at documenting its different phases and the rationales behind the decisions that
have been made. It is based on an analysis of a comprehensive and extensive collection of
documents (policy programs, government reports, parliamentary records, ministerial
speeches, news media sources, etc.) and interviews, conducted by the author, with key poli-
cymakers involved in the development of counterterrorism policy.
The Development of Counterterrorism Policy in Finland
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has dealt with terrorist related issues since the late
1950s. The main context in which the threat of terrorism has usually arisen was the arrang-
ing of protection during state visits, which required up-to-date knowledge about the terrorist
threat situation more widely in Europe and around the world. The resources directed at
monitoring the terrorist threat were very small. In the 1970s, there was only one person
whose time was fully allocated to that purpose. Even in the early 1980s, the staff of the ter-
rorism section in the Finnish Security Intelligence Service consisted of only six intendants
and a secretary.17
As these numbers indicate, at a time when many other European states were developing
their counterterrorism policies to counter the threat of left-wing terrorist movements or Pal-
estinian hijackings of airplanes, terrorism was still considered a very marginal issue in Fin-
land. The terrorist threat only gained a more significant status in the 1990s.
Counterterrorism as a separate policy area is an even more recent development.
The concept of a “counterterrorism policy” refers here to all legislation, policies, and func-
tions that are explicitly linked to counterterrorism. The focus is on the development of
domestic policies.18 The analysis starts with the 1990s when terrorism for the first time
became an issue that was seen in broader terms, that is, more than just something that the
police and immigration officials could deal with. Based on the changes in policy drivers, the
measures adopted, and terrorist threat assessments, the development of Finnish counterter-
rorism policy can be roughly divided into four phases: (1) the introduction of the terrorist
threat issue to security policy documents (1990s), (2) policy development as a result of inter-
national pressure (2001–2007), (3) the introduction of national policies (2008–2012), and
(4) the politicization of counterterrorism (2013–).
Phase 1: The Introduction of the Terrorist Threat Issue to Security Policy Documents
(1990s)
The roots of the development of counterterrorism into a separate policy area of its own can
be traced back to the 1990s when the word found its way into key security related
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documents. 19 At that time, the direct terrorist threat to Finland was considered as minimal
as it had been in previous decades. The impetus for developing counterterrorism policies
came from another direction.
The development of counterterrorism policy has to be put into the context of a broader
rewriting of Finnish foreign and security policy. In these years, Finland was adapting to the
new security environment of the post-Cold War era.20 The traditional narrow focus on mili-
tary threats was replaced (or rather supplemented) by a “broad and comprehensive concept
of security,”21 largely following the way in which security threats were conceived by many
other Western states at the time. This meant that increasing attention was to be paid to so-
called new threats. Terrorism entered the threat perceptions as part of this “package” of new
threats, along with, for example, organized crime, the drug and illegal arms trade, the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction,22 human rights violations, damage to infrastructure,
information threats, disasters, environmental change, epidemics, and migration flows.23
Typical of these new threats was the fact that they crossed state borders. Finnish security,
especially when it came to these new threats, was seen as closely intertwined with European
security. The foreign and security policy reports from this period also underlined the need
for constructive cooperation in the new situation and that it was important for Finland as
part of the West to do its share in countering these new threats.24
The reinterpretation of threat perceptions can also be seen, according to Jarno Limnell, as
part of Finnish identity politics. During the Cold War, Finland was caught in an uneasy posi-
tion between the eastern and the western blocs. Finland did not wish to be perceived as part
of the east but, instead, preferred to present itself as a culturally Western but militarily neu-
tral country. The proximity of the Soviet Union made it difficult for Finland to align itself
fully with the West. After the end of the Cold War, Finland started increasingly to emphasise
and deepen its connections and interdependence with Western states. The alignment of the
threat perceptions with those of the Western states was a way of signaling that Finland
belonged to the West. 25
The “upgrading” of terrorism as an issue of national security, however, did not lead to any
significant investment in counterterrorism.26 Nothing in the policy documents or parliamen-
tary discussions indicates that any particular importance was attached to countering the
threat of terrorism in Finland. The most visible change from the Finnish perspective was
that international cooperation in counterterrorism intensified. What further intensified this
change in orientation was the approaching Finnish EU Presidency in 1999. In the annual
report of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo) for the year 1998, it was stated that:
A collective responsibility in countering terrorism has increased. When we intensify the cooper-
ation with the world around us, we do not have a lot of independent discretion in whether or
not to participate in the new countermeasures that create new responsibilities, even in the cur-
rent situation in which terrorism is not an immediate problem for Finland.27
This became all the more evident in the years after the 9/11 attacks.
Phase 2: Development as a Result of International Pressure (2001–2007)
After the 9/11 attacks, the attention directed at terrorism-related issues increased rapidly and
dramatically in Finland. Over the next few years, terrorism gained a more central role in
Finnish policymaking than before. Again, this was not due to changes in national threat
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assessments. Already in the first evaluations one day after the attack, the prime minister
reported that the attacks did not indicate that the security situation in Finland had changed.
This view was affirmed several times by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and key pol-
iticians over the course of the next few years, although it was argued that it was important to
keep a close eye on developments.28
Even though the attacks did not change these threat assessments, their aftermath had
many different effects in Finland. One immediate effect was the tremendous increase in the
workload of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. This was mostly due to the number of
international queries, which skyrocketed overnight. The situation also challenged the tradi-
tional methods of countering terrorism and pushed the service to renew its organization and
operations. During 2001–2002, it was given more resources to fulfill its tasks, although the
increase was very marginal compared to many other countries. The same goes for the quali-
tative change in the service’s working methods.29 What changed permanently was that coun-
terterrorism became a field thoroughly and increasingly penetrated by intensive
international cooperation, and counterterrorism became an issue that concerned various
branches of the government.30
The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also brought counterterrorism issues before the Finnish
Parliament like never before. This is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the number of par-
liamentary issues (government proposals, written and oral questions, and so forth) that have
dealt with terrorism in one way or another. Whereas during the previous decade, there had
been in total four parliamentary issues in which terrorism was mentioned, the number of
such issues was 19 in the year 2001 alone.
Most of these issues were either reports or legislation that can be traced back to interna-
tional treaties and discussions. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Finland expressed its solidarity
with the United States and strong support for international cooperation.31 It was announced
that Finland would implement all those measures demanded by international treaties. This
was very predictable, because being seen as a good international partner had been a long-
standing principle of Finnish foreign policy. It was indeed this commitment that was the
main driving force behind counterterrorism policymaking in the first years after 2001. Coun-
terterrorism remained an issue that was most of all connected with foreign and security pol-
icy commitments.
Figure 1. The number of terrorism-related issues in the Finnish Parliament, 1990–2014.
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The most visible and long-lasting counterterrorism measure adopted in these years was
the introduction of a separate chapter 34a on terrorist offenses in the Criminal Code in early
2003 to comply with the EU Council framework decision on combating terrorism (2002/475/
JHA). Although an overwhelming majority of the acts (like hostage taking, bomb attacks,
assault, or murder) that the framework decision criminalized were already addressed in
other sections of the Criminal Code, there was no legislation that would distinguish a terror-
ist offense from similar kinds of offenses committed without a terrorist intent.32 Several
other bills based on international treaties, EU directives, and framework decisions were
passed in these years, dealing, among other things, with the financing of terrorism, extradi-
tion, port security, data retention, transportation of dangerous goods, and police powers.
Most of these issues passed through parliament without opposition. All the political par-
ties agreed that it was important to be a good partner and to meet one’s international obliga-
tions. Overall, although the attitude of Finnish politicians was positive, they were largely
disinterested in developing a counterterrorism policy. There was a strong consensus that
Finland should not be allowed to become a safe haven for terrorists, but no party adopted
counterterrorism as one of its flagship projects. A general concern among politicians and
policymakers, including the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, was to avoid spreading
fear among the population. In the first Internal Security Programme of 2004, it was stated
that “the fear of terrorism may become larger than the likelihood [of a terrorist attack] and,
in the worst case, it may become a factor limiting people’s lives and activities.”33 This
reflected the traditional message that the government had communicated to citizens during
any crisis—stay calm, the authorities are up to date and taking care of the situation.
There is also evidence that the European Union (EU) and other states were not always
completely pleased with Finland’s calm and restrained attitude toward counterterrorism.
The United States expressed its criticism of Finland’s contribution to the War on Terror.
Jarno Limnell relates in his book how the United States tried to convince Finland about the
danger of violent Islamism and in particular criticized Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s
mellow statements after the Madrid attacks. If the United States had had its way, Vanhanen
would have clearly stated that a similar attack could have happened in Finland too.34 More-
over, even though Finland has been relatively conscientious in implementing international
obligations, it has had its share of criticism from the EU. In the first EU counterterrorism
peer review report, Finland was criticized for its insufficient toolbox for preventing terrorist
crimes.
Finnish politicians and policymakers, for their part, were occasionally lamenting the
speed and extent of new initiatives coming from the EU and other international bodies. In
those cases where the new legislation and measures provoked any debate, a common criti-
cism of these international initiatives was whether the same kind of measures that were
found in other countries that faced a considerably more serious terrorism threat were really
needed in Finland. Such claims, together with concerns over the seemingly ever expanding
powers given to the police in the name of countering terrorism, were expressed in parliament
when, for example, the changes requested in the EU peer review report were implemented.35
These international obligations and recommendations were also sometimes criticized
because it was believed that they would lead to unnecessarily complicated bureaucracy,
heavy costs or processes, and legislation that did not fit very well with the Finnish system.
For example, the first drafts of the aforementioned EU framework decision that introduced
this terrorism legislation were met with criticism because they included such severe
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sentences and vague expressions that it would have been extremely difficult to incorporate
them into the Finnish Criminal Code.36 When implementing these international obligations,
the guiding line was that criminalization was not to be extended any further than was neces-
sary.37 Consequently, Finland is among those Western liberal democracies that have intro-
duced the least restrictions on privacy rights, procedural rights, and immigration and
foreigners laws.38 Also in the context of international cooperation, the Finnish authorities
repeatedly emphasized, sometimes with a concerned tone, the importance of respecting indi-
vidual rights and freedoms in countering terrorism.
Throughout the 2000s, even though terrorism became a much more important political
question in Finland than it had been before, counterterrorism remained an issue that was
not openly politicized in the sense that it became an issue of public political contestation or
that a reference to a terrorist threat was used to legitimate further initiatives beyond those
required by international treaties. The policy’s development was largely driven by public
administration. In very few cases did counterterrorist policymaking receive more publicity
and involve visible politicking.39 It seems safe to conclude that Finnish counterterrorism
activities in these years consisted of a conglomeration of measures that were taken to fulfill
international obligations, respond to other kinds of international pressure, or to address lim-
ited practical concerns.
Phase 3: Introduction of National Policies (2008–2012)
During the latter part of the 2000s, Finnish counterterrorism policymaking began to acquire
new dimensions. While international obligations had largely driven policymaking up until
then, national initiatives now began to increase. Since 2008, Finland has adopted a number
of measures that have not been required by any international agreement. Furthermore,
counterterrorism started increasingly to penetrate internal security strategies.
The first signs of this development were visible in the Programme for Internal Security for
the years 2008–2012. One of the actions in the program was to develop a national counter-
terrorist strategy for Finland. Another objective mentioned in the program was to develop
ways of preventing and detecting violent radicalization at an early stage.40
The first national counterterrorist strategy was approved in the spring of 2010. In the first
pages of the strategy, it is stated that “the underlying theme of this strategy is to maintain
the high level of state activity and to further develop cooperation and coordination.”41 The
desire to improve cooperation and clarify the roles of different branches of government
seems to be one of the major reasons for drafting the strategy. This was partly linked to inter-
national developments. As terrorism-related issues penetrated the agendas of various policy
sectors, an increasing number of Finnish policymakers and politicians participated in inter-
national working groups and negotiations. This created a challenge at home—how to make
sure that all those representing Finland had all the information they needed and that they
were aware of Finland’s stand on various matters.
While the purpose of the strategy was expressed in administrative terms, it went beyond
just improving cooperation between different authorities. The strategy included action to
introduce amendments to current terrorism legislation that were not required by any inter-
national treaty. It was stated that the existing legislation on terrorist crimes should be revised
so that financing the directing and training of a terrorist group, as well as the recruiting of
individuals into such groups was also criminalized. By way of further justification, it was
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mentioned that such acts were already criminalized in several other EU countries. These
demands were linked to types of activities that had been detected or suspected in Finland,
but, due to current legislation, it was difficult for the authorities to investigate them properly
and eventually press charges.42 The amendments were eventually approved in by parliament
in December 2014.
This decision to expand terrorist legislation represented a break from Finland’s earlier line
of doing only the minimum that was required to meet the obligations set down by interna-
tional treaties and EU framework decisions.43 This policy change can be linked to changing
assessments of the terrorist threat to Finland. Toward the end of the 2000s, the authorities
started to view the terrorist threat as increasingly relevant to Finland. The direct threat of
terrorist attacks was still considered low, but whether it would remain this way was now
questioned. There were two main reasons for this.
First, the threat of terrorism seemed to approach Finland geographically. When looking
for signs of things to come with regard to political activism and extremism, the Finnish
authorities have traditionally turned their eyes toward other Nordic countries (and
Germany). Around these years, the authorities started to emphasize that the number and
seriousness of planned terrorist attacks in Nordic countries was increasing. The planned ter-
rorist attacks revealed in other Nordic countries had already been mentioned in the Finnish
Security Intelligence Service’s annual report for 200544 and had been underlined again in the
national counterterrorism strategy five years later. The Danish cartoon crisis was specifically
mentioned as an example of “how a European country can quickly become a target for
hatred among radical groups.”45
Another incident that undoubtedly shaped views on the terrorist threat was the suicide
bombing attempt in Stockholm in December 2010.46 A couple of days after the attack, Presi-
dent Tarja Halonen stated that it was only a matter of time before something similar to that
attack happened in Finland. The same point was made by Alexander Stubb, the minister of
foreign affairs. The statements differed significantly from the earlier announcements empha-
sizing the improbability of an attack in the country.47
Second, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service started to bring the government’s atten-
tion to the fact that the terrorist situation in Finland was already changing. According to its
assessments, the number of individuals who had ties with terrorist organizations was
increasing in Finland and these ties were becoming ever closer. What kind of developments
these assessments were exactly based on, is difficult to say, because the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service has been very sparing in its comments. What we do know is that a Finn-
ish citizen of Moroccan origin, known for his strong connections to jihadist networks, came
back to Finland after having been expelled from Sweden in 2008.48 The first terrorism-
related case that led to a pretrial investigation and eventually a court case started around this
time as well. Four individuals were eventually charged with financing and/or recruiting for
al-Shabaab and given a suspended prison sentence.49
During this period, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service started actively communicat-
ing its concerns to political leaders. The message communicated to political leaders was that
while future threat scenarios were not that different to those in other western European
countries, the resources allocated to countering terrorism were severely lagging behind. The
Finnish Security Intelligence Service also sought to bring these issues into the public debate.
In June 2009, in a highly unusual and visible op-ed, the head of the service Ilkka Salmi,
together with the head of the Finnish Immigration Service Jorma Vuorio claimed that the
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days of trial and error in Finnish immigration policy were over and that without significantly
heavier investment in integration, Finland would face a more serious terrorism situation in
the future.50
Changes in the security environment also challenged the working methods of the Finnish
Security Intelligence Service. Under the leadership of Ilkka Salmi, the service started to talk
about pushing the first lines of defense further away from Finland. As part of this strategy,
the service broadened its operations by stationing its employees to Finnish embassies to
selected African states. The objective was to prevent potential terrorists from traveling to
Finland. While this was not an extraordinary counterterrorist measure as such, it was a his-
torical change in the functions of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. It was the first
time that the service had extended its operations beyond Finland’s national borders.51
Besides the aforementioned National Counterterrorism Strategy, the Programme for
Internal Security for the years 2008–2012 also included developing a plan to prevent radical-
ization into terrorism. Here, international influences are very clear. This idea came from pol-
icymakers who had closely followed developments and discussions elsewhere in Europe after
the 2005 London attacks. The preparatory documents drafted in 2007 highlighted the fact
that the situation in Finland at that moment was good, but that one should take seriously
the possibility that violent radicalization similar to that which had already taken place in sev-
eral other European countries would also happen in the future in Finland.52 This part of the
program was, however, not implemented. This was because it was decided at ministerial level
that it was not (yet) the right time to start such activities. The reason for this was that there
were no signs of significant radicalization and the introduction of the program at that
moment had the potential to do more harm than good.53
When the time came to draft the next Programme for Internal Security in 2011, the time
was now considered ripe for counterradicalization efforts. The first national strategy for pre-
venting violent extremism was published in June 2012.54 No international body had
demanded such an action plan to be introduced in Finland, although “prevent” is one of the
four pillars of the EU’s counterterrorism strategy.
Like the national counterterrorism strategy, the action plan to prevent violent extremism
also strongly focuses on improving cooperation and information exchange between the vari-
ous authorities involved, as well as on developing situational awareness. At the time of writ-
ing, local cooperative networks between different authorities are developing different ways
of conducting (individual level) interventions. It is also worth noting that the action plan is
not limited to violent jihadist radicalization only. It also includes violent extremism linked
to the far right and far left, as well as school shootings.55 In practice, though, the main focus
has been on jihadist radicalization.
Having said all that, it is important to stress that even though the initiative for these
national strategies lay in the national level, these developments were also closely tied to inter-
national cooperation and Finnish foreign policy considerations. In many ways, these
national strategies have made the influence and extent of international pressure and cooper-
ation even more visible. Even if certain policies have only been recommended, their imple-
mentation is often monitored and reported in the international level. Willingness to be seen
as a good and reliable international partner can be a strong incentive to comply with the
recommendations.
The national counterterrorism strategy is a case in point. Even though there was no inter-
national-level obligation to introduce a national strategy, there was definitely strong pressure
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to do so, through recommendations coming from, for example, the EU level and in the form
of expectations that were voiced in international meetings. Policymakers have conflicting
recollections about whether EU peer review reports recommended that Finland introduce a
national counterterrorist strategy. Having a national strategy, in any case, unquestionably
made it easier for Finland to look good at EU meetings. This was well captured by one key
Finnish policymaker in an interview with this author:
When you sit around the table in an EU meeting and say that you have done nothing, because
you have not considered the [terrorist] threat to be that serious, well, you kind of feel like a
backwoodsman. This is also true for ministers. When they talk about these issues at the EU level
and it comes up that you have not done anything, well, your country gets placed in a certain cat-
egory of states. As regards preventing violent extremism, Western European and other Nordic
states have actively developed their policies while Eastern European countries are in a different
league. When you have a national strategy, it is easier to show that you are doing something.56
The influence of international debates, obligations, and recommendations is also visible in
Finland’s counterterrorism strategy. In the most recent version of the strategy (2014), a lot of
space is given to going through the international counterterrorism fora in which Finland
participates. Looking at the list of actions to be taken, one cannot escape the impression that
their origins lie at least as much in international fora as in national needs. For example, it is
hard to see at the moment why improving coordination in chemical, biological, radioactive,
nuclear, and explosive materials (CBRNE)–related matters would be a national priority. This
does not mean that the actions would not be beneficial from the national perspective too.
Rather, it testifies to the fact that international commitments continue to drive the policy
agenda in this field to a significant degree.
International influences are also evident in more indirect ways such as in descriptions of
changes in the terrorist threat, the analysis of the causes of violent radicalization, and how
terrorism and radicalization into violent extremism should be countered all these draw
heavily on international debates and “authoritative knowledge.” EU-level cooperation, for
example within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), seems to play a particularly
important role. It has been common to criticize the EU for being an inefficient counterter-
rorism actor. From the Finnish perspective, however, it is impossible to miss the strong effect
that peer interaction and social learning have had in national-level policymaking.
Phase 4: Politicization of Counterterrorism (2013–)
When the aforementioned national programs were introduced in 2010 and 2012, respec-
tively, they were hardly even noticed in the media. Interest in counterterrorism issues was
already increasing, but it was still limited. It almost seemed like counterterrorism was an
issue that politicians, with a couple of rare exceptions, explicitly avoided touching on. What
may have restrained the debate on counterterrorism is that open debate about issues related
to crises and security have traditionally been considered politically unconstructive.57
Around 2013, the dynamics and content of the public debate about terrorism and coun-
terterrorism started to change. These issues are now much more often commented upon by
politicians and discussed more broadly in the media. A major reason for this is the flow of
foreign (terrorist) fighters from Finland to Syria and Iraq. At the end of 2014, it was esti-
mated that over 50 people have left Finland to travel to Syria or Iraq since 2012. The number
is high per capita, although it needs to be kept in mind that the figure includes all those who
352 L. MALKKI
have left for Syria and Iraq and not only those who are known to be or suspected of being
foreign fighters. It is not clear in every case what those who have left have ended up doing in
Syria or Iraq, but the Finnish Security Intelligence Service believes that about 75 percent of
those who have left have sought to become fighters in the ranks of jihadist groups. It is
believed that most of them have joined armed groups such as ISIS or Jabat al-Nusra. Besides
Syria, some people have also left to go and fight in Somalia.58
These numbers appear even more striking when they are contrasted with the very limited
degree of radical Islamist activities in Finland before the Syrian conflict. The foreign fighter
phenomenon, together with the steadily increasing number of individuals interested in vio-
lent radical Islamism, has made the Finnish Security Intelligence Service change its publicly
communicated assessment of the terrorist threat for the first time. The threat of attacks by
terrorist organizations proper is still considered low, but the service is increasingly worried
that individuals or small groups of radical Islamists may commit attacks in Finland, either
on their own or with support from abroad. In the fall of 2014, four people suspected of ter-
rorist crimes were arrested, most probably in connection with the situation in Syria.59
National Police Commissioner Mikko Paatero stated in an interview that “it is… only a
question of time before an act of brutal violence takes place in our country. Thinking in any
other way would be childish.”60 Besides violent attacks inspired by radical Islamism, the
authorities are concerned about the possibility of school rampage shootings or other kinds
of lone actor attacks.
During the last two years, issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism have become
regular topics in the public debate. It was largely during 2014 that counterterrorism and
counter-radicalization issues for the first time became widely accepted as questions relevant to
Finland in their own right. The foreign fighter phenomenon has led to a lively (for Finland)
debate on what kind of implications it may have for Finland in the long term and what kind
of measures should be taken to counter it. The discussion has particularly revolved around
what could be done to prevent people from leaving for Syria and Iraq and what should be
done with those who return. There is a noticeable shift away from developing capabilities to
counter terrorism and violent extremism in general toward adopting more specific measures
to deal with particular questions, in this case, the foreign fighter phenomenon.
The powers and resources granted to counterterrorism have also been critically evaluated.
The police have already been given more funding for countering terrorism.61 Most of this
funding is directed at improving the equipment of special intervention units. Much less
attention and resources have been directed at, for example, improving intelligence gathering.
Counterterrorism needs are one reason behind current evaluations as to whether the author-
ities should be given powers for electronic surveillance and intelligence outside Finland.
Unlike authorities in many other EU countries, the Finnish authorities do not yet have such
powers or capabilities. While the initiative has strong political support, it also has strong
opposition.62
Another new feature of the last two years is that the government has been openly criti-
cized for not doing enough to counter terrorism. Representatives of the populist Finns party
have been most vocal in this respect. They have blamed the government and the authorities
for not taking the threat of radical Islamism seriously, called radical Islamism the biggest
security threat in Finland at the moment, and demanded stricter measures to counter terror-
ism, including outlawing Islamist organizations, banning radical Islamist preachers from
entering the country, and revising legislation on immigration and citizenship so that people
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with ties to terrorism can be more efficiently deported and prevented from entering the
country in the first place as immigrants.63
Support for broadening counterterrorism legislation and for measures against terrorism
and radicalization into violent extremism has clearly increased. This seems to be especially
the case with measures designed to prevent attacks and/or radicalization. While only a cou-
ple of years ago, policymakers had to put quite a lot of effort into getting relevant actors
motivated to participate in policy planning and implementation, this is not the case now.
At the same time, the influence of international debates on counterterrorism and counter-
radicalization continues to be strong and policymakers actively seek out lessons to be learned
from abroad. New international obligations and recommendations are also being intro-
duced, the latest ones being those deriving from the UN Security Council Resolution 2178
and the new additional protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism. These documents deal with criminalizing traveling abroad with terrorist inten-
tions. Even though Finnish attitudes toward counterterrorism have changed, the friction
between international recommendations and national evaluations has not completely disap-
peared. Again, it strongly looks like the legislative changes recommended in these treaties
will be implemented, but if it was solely a matter for Finland, it is far from certain that such
changes would be introduced.
International Pressure and Fostering Political Resilience to Terrorism
By now, it should be evident that international pressure and cooperation in developing
counterterrorism policies and legislation has clearly influenced Finnish counterterrorism
policymaking. It turns out to have been the most important policy driver throughout the
whole period analyzed in this article. The question that we will now turn to is what we
should think about it.
The attitude of Finnish authorities and policymakers toward international cooperation
and its influence on Finnish policy has generally been positive. They seem to have been very
aware of international pressure to perform, and this pressure has been seen largely as a good
thing. It seems to have helped overcome some of the issues that countries with a low domes-
tic threat assessment face. As politicians have largely been uninterested in counterterrorism
issues, international obligations and pressures have provided the necessary driving force for
policy development.
Furthermore, as the need to be a good international partner is widely accepted, interna-
tional obligations and recommendations have provided strong legitimation for introducing
counterterrorism legislation and measures. This may also partly explain why counterterror-
ism has attracted so little political attention. Meeting international expectations in itself gave
the impression that Finland was dealing with the terrorist threat responsibly. This state of
affairs has also allowed policymakers to keep a low profile in counterterrorism policymaking
and thereby avoid stoking fears among the public that there might be terrorist threats out
there, which the security authorities were keeping from the public.
What is seen as a positive or negative development, always depends on one’s point of
view. Here, the influence of international pressure is approached from the point of view of
political resilience: Has international pressure helped Finland draft a counterterrorism policy
that has mitigated the threat of terrorism in Finland and that is in harmony with Finnish
political and legal culture? While it is too early to reach any definite conclusions about this,
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and evaluating the role of different factors in policy processes is inherently difficult, it is pos-
sible to make some observations.
One benefit undoubtedly enjoyed by Finland until very recently is the fact that it has had
the opportunity to prepare and discuss new laws and measures without political pressure. As
one representative of the police said in an interview with the author, “these things need to be
done in peace time.”64 More typically, calls for new legislation and other measures arise and
are dealt with in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. With all the shock, feelings of
insecurity, and political pressure to prevent further attacks, that is hardly the best time to
have an informed and level-headed debate about the pros and cons of proposed laws and
measures. On the basis of this study’s findings, it seems very unlikely that Finland would
have invested nearly as much on developing its national counterterrorism policy and intro-
ducing legislation as early as it did were it not for international pressure to do so.
However, international obligations and expectations have arguably in some cases limited
the ability of Finland as a country to consider these issues, even though counterterrorism
policy still remains largely a matter for sovereign states. The Finnish legal tradition and
international obligations have sometimes collided and led to the introduction of legislation
that does not fully meet the criteria usually set for law making. Secondly, there have also
been conflicts between international expectations and national traditions when it comes the
way, or style, in which the government communicates with the public. A typically Finnish
feature of communicating with the public in times of crisis is the desire to avoid unnecessar-
ily alarming the public. The authorities have been very restrained in their use of the term
“crisis” when describing various challenging situations in the first place and even more spar-
ing in the use of the word terrorism.65 From an international perspective, this sometimes
seems to have been interpreted as not taking the threat of terrorism sufficiently seriously.
The most significant concerns are, however, related to policies that are designed to pre-
vent radicalization into terrorism. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, counterter-
rorism nowadays includes a much stronger preventative element than before. This means,
among other things, that even countries that do not have a “terrorism problem” are expected
to introduce policies designed to counter violent extremism. Even though it is not always
stated explicitly, it is commonly assumed that the earlier one starts with preventative meas-
ures against violent radicalization and terrorism, the better. The rationale for this seems to
be that it is best to intervene at an early stage when dealing with adverse developments.
One testimony of the pressure to develop preventative policies is the fact that the discus-
sion about introducing such policies started in Finland before any significant radicalization
was observed in the country. One might conclude from this that Finland was in a rather
good position—the country had a real opportunity to design a genuinely preventative policy.
While countries that get engaged early in this way are often applauded for their far-sight-
edness, there has been much less debate about the problematics that “starting early” may
entail. How Finland got started with its program for preventing violent extremism provides
a good window into thinking about these problematics. As already mentioned, the idea of
beginning to develop such a program was discussed in 2007. However, at that time, there
were no clear signs of violent radicalization and it was considered too early to start such a
program. In retrospect, however, it may look as if Finland missed an opportunity here. Soon
after 2007, the situation in Finland became more alarming. Since then, the number of indi-
viduals who the Finnish Security Intelligence Service considers “risk persons”66 has
multiplied.
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 355
An inherent problem with early prevention is that it is unavoidably based on some kind of
prediction about future developments. One could reasonably argue that based on what was
happening in other European countries, the direction in which the situation in Finland
would develop should have been evident to Finnish policymakers in 2007. This argument is
not without its problems. If one looks at other recent transnational waves of violent extrem-
ism (e.g., the so-called New Left wave of the 1960s–1980s and far right extremism in the
1990s), their effects in Finland have been very mellow.
One danger that international cooperation can bring derives from the fact that security
practices that aim at preventing terrorism and preempting terrorist plans require some kind
of construction of terrorist threat scenarios. Marieke de Goede has called this process “pre-
mediation” by which she means “imagining a variety of futures… in order to enable action
in the present.”67
With intensive international orientation, it is possible that national security premediation
becomes to be based on an excessive and/or deterministic projection of the international
imagining of the terrorist threat onto the national context without sufficient consideration
of local variables. This process of imagining is not inconsequential as it also has a performa-
tive element. As De Goede writes, “[t]his does not mean that disastrous imagined futures
will inevitably play out, but it does mean that the imagination of some scenarios over others,
the visualization of some futures and not others, entails profoundly political work that ena-
bles and constrains political decision-making in the present.”68
Therefore, it does not seem warranted to assume outright that the “the earlier the better”
approach in preventing terrorism would automatically lead to increased resilience to terror-
ism. Preventing violent radicalization is not necessarily a business that follows a “better sorry
than safe” logic either. Critical literature on counterradicalization warns that preventative
programs may end up producing counterproductive effects and lead, for example, to the
“suspected communities” phenomenon.69 Any preventative action unavoidably requires
some level of premediation and attempts at guessing who might be in danger of being radi-
calized. The weaker the signals are, the more imagination this process entails. There is a deli-
cate balance between constructive predictions and seeing ghosts where there are none, and
thereby even bringing them into existence.
Furthermore, the situation in which Finland developed and is developing its counterra-
dicalization programs continues to be very different from countries such as the United King-
dom and the Netherlands in which significant radicalization had already taken place. Most
attempts to prevent violent extremism are based on cases where significant radical milieus
were already in existence or at least strongly in the making. To which degree lessons drawn
from preventing violent radicalization in these kinds of contexts are applicable to a context
in which there is no violent radicalization to speak of, is a question that has been seldom
addressed. Another largely unexplored question is at what point it would be best to start try-
ing to prevent violent extremism.
An excessively international orientation in counterterrorism may also lead to paying less
attention to domestic history and developments. In this respect, the policy discussions
around preventing violent extremism in Finland have had a curious dynamic. Policy docu-
ments often note that there has been little political violence in Finland in the post-Second
World War period and that the scale of violent radicalization remains limited compared
with many other countries. Little attention, however, has been given to what has made Fin-
land such a peaceful place in terms of political violence. The search for useful lessons to be
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learnt about terrorism is almost without exception concentrated on examining the experien-
ces of other European countries, which nowadays are faced with and trying to tackle much
more serious threats arising from violent radicalization, rather than on analyzing Finland’s
own history.
This international orientation also carries the risk that, with transnational threats in the
limelight, other violent threats of a more domestic nature are left in the shadows. If one looks
at violent acts in Finland in the post-9/11 period and evaluates the threat in terms of the
number of casualties and the number of plots uncovered, the most relevant threat is undeni-
ably school rampage shootings. To be sure, extensive policies have been developed to prevent
school rampage shootings in the future. However, they have received much less political and
public attention than one might have expected.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to analyze the impact of international cooperation on the
dynamics of the development of a national counterterrorism policy by looking at it through
the lens of a periphery. Finland’s experience clearly shows the powerful role of international
cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. It is not only based on obligations, but also works
through peer pressure and social learning. Becoming a safe haven for terrorism is something
that most countries want to avoid, but foreign policy considerations and a desire to be seen
as a reliable international partner seem to have been at least as important motivations for
developing counterterrorism policies. It is true that issues related to counterterrorism still
remain largely within the remit national sovereign states. Having said that, counterterrorism
has become such an important issue and a field that is almost overflowing with recommen-
dations, reporting to international institutions, and peer pressure that there are clear incen-
tives to do more than the bare minimum. Finland’s example clearly shows that
counterterrorism has also increasingly become an issue for countries with a low threat level.
By providing an empirically based case study, the article has hopefully contributed toward
understanding the policy dynamics in such countries.
The article has also underlined the need for critical thinking about whether the pressure
to comply with international obligations and expectations always contributes toward sound
national counterterrorism policies that foster political resilience in the face of terrorism.
This is a particularly acute question for countries like Finland where the national threat level
is considered to be low. There has been very little debate about what constitutes a propor-
tionate counterterrorism policy in such countries. In developing their policies, they face
some questions that those countries with a higher threat level do not face. To what degree
are the models and practices developed in countries with higher threat levels applicable?
How should, or can, one mobilize support for developing counterterrorism in the absence of
a significant domestic threat? How and when should one start to try to prevent violent
extremism? Is genuine, early prevention really a feasible and realistic option and worth the
risks that it may entail?
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